‘The Patriarchate perception’ in Turkey’s global strategy by Bekir Günay & Emrah Usta*
19/7/2011
The institution known officially as the Fener Greek Patriarchate in Turkey and the Ecumenical Patriarchate in the rest of the world, serves as the spiritual leader of the Orthodox community, whose members exceed 250 million.
After the Roman Empire split into East and West, the Christians in the Byzantine Empire were subordinated to the İstanbul Orthodox Church, whereas the Orthodox Church known as the Oriental Church separated from the Catholic Church in the fifth century. Noticing this dual distinction between religious groups, Fatih Sultan Mehmet recognized the depth of all these in the Patriarch of the Byzantine Empire.
It could be said that Mehmet relied on some expansionist policies that did not actually seem pursuable at the beginning. A problem arose in the vast empire stretching from Dardanelles to Edirne and even Trachea. This problem was born in an empire unable to penetrate the Balkans and expand its territories. This structure, the Orthodox Patriarch, controlled the Orthodox world and enjoyed vast territory stretching from the Balkans to Moscow, from Jerusalem to Alexandria. Attempting to create such a powerful front is the main motive for Fatih Sultan Mehmet’s decision to emphasize the state vision through İstanbul on the one hand and Rome and Madrid on the other. The key to this attempt was the conquest of İstanbul, which was controlled by the Byzantines.
In line with this policy, the Ottoman sultan issued some decrees recognizing some privileges for the Patriarchate and this became a custom of the state up until Mahmud II. The Ottoman rulers, under this custom, granted privileges to the Patriarchate and thus the legal status of the Fener Greek Patriarchate became permanent.
Where does Turkey stand in the Patriarchate issue?
Turkey has been trying to identify specific policies regarding the Patriarchate issue since 2003. The foreign policy changes in the second term of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party) also had implications for domestic policies. This was followed by attempts to integrate non-Muslims and non-Turks into the system through a democratization process that peaked in the Sept. 12, 2010 referendum. While it is too early to witness the results of the opening process, further moves should follow. The main goal here is to expedite the creation of a democratic constitution by President Abdullah Gül, who acts independent of political considerations and governmental priorities, and to contribute to the emergence of a civilian approach.
Contrary to popular belief, the Patriarchate issue and similar problems are not only related to foreign affairs but also to domestic politics. In recent years, the government has acted humbly, not taking the European court’s decision to an upper appeal chamber in the aftermath of Hrant Dink’s murder and adopting a lenient discourse toward the Armenians, which has had constructive impacts on the Greek minority in Turkey as well.
A moderate stance was adopted on this matter by granting Armenians permission to hold religious services in the Akhdamar Church in Van province and Greeks in the Sümela Monastery in Trabzon province. Armenian Daron Acemoğlu’s being offered the position of permanent representative to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) is further proof of Turkey’s changing policy towards non-Muslims in the country. However, giving the impression that these policies were adopted to facilitate Turkey’s accession to the EU is not a proper strategy.
Considering all these elements, it is evident that the issue of the Patriarchate’s status will sooner or later be the most serious issue for Turkey to address. Turkey should adopt a more comprehensive approach than simply subordinating the Patriarchate to the Fatih District Governor’s Office and it should redesign this institution within its 2023 vision. Turkey should be able to use this as part of a global power strategy.
Evidently, a number of states, including the US, Germany and Russia, are interested in the Patriarchate issue. It is also apparent that Russia has a particular interest and that the current policies will cause some sort of tension with Russia. While Russian the perspective overlaps with the Turkish stance in regards to the reopening the Halki Seminary, it is obvious that it will pursue a more aggressive policy — despite its strategic ties with Turkey — in case of the Patriarch’s death or sickness.
Russian interests
Russia wants to consolidate its domination over the Patriarch and the Orthodox people by ensuring the opening of Halki Seminary because the Patriarch has to be a graduate of the Halki Seminary, despite the fact that he is a Turkish citizen under the Treaty of Lausanne. The Patriarchate remains disinterested in this issue for now. Another power that will be influential in the multidimensional relations of the Patriarchate will be the European Union line stretching from England to Greece.
Turkey should place trust in the Patriarchate to continue its domination over the Orthodox world and the establishment of a check-and-balance mechanism. To this end, the measures to be taken in connection with the 2023 vision include opening the Halki Seminary, which should be opened not only for the Greek minority, but also for Armenian and Assyrian citizens. Further steps should also include assigning the graduates of the seminary as public servants, redefining the status of the Patriarch, having heads of state and the prime minister attend some religious services and establishing a ministry of religious and sectarian unity instead of the current Religious Affairs Directorate. The Turkish Cooperation and Development Agency (TİKA) should take steps towards the Orthodox world as well.
The AK Party, which well understands arguments within the system of religion and belief, should make greater efforts to offer lasting solutions to the ongoing problems that the Patriarchate and non-Muslim citizens encounter (reopening of the Halki Seminary, the assets of the foundations). It appears that the party is determined to take constructive steps in the matter. Such a constructive approach will raise t non-Muslims’ confidence in the state authority and consolidate the country’s strength against European and other regional states.
In conclusion, it is impossible to comprehend the issue of the Patriarchate, which suffered greatly from a firm legal status in the late stages of the Ottoman Empire and the early stages of the republican era, through 21st century policies. To this end, Turkey needs to consider this issue to devise a proper global strategy in connection with the 2023 vision. Turkey’s current ambivalence toward the issue is mainly attributable to its susceptibility to foreign interference and nationalistic sentiments in the country. However, it should also be recalled that such problems may be overcome by integrating different communities from the Orthodox world in the process.
*Bekir Günay is an associate professor at İstanbul Süleyman Şah University and a Central Asia fellow at the Wise Men Center for Strategic Studies (BİLGESAM) in İstanbul and co-author, Emrah Usta is a transatlantic fellow at the Praxis Thinking Institute.
